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Recent critique of the law regulating spousal homicide has centred on the
obstacles frequently encountered by female defendants: inter alia their relative
inability, compared to male counterparts to avail themselves of defences to
homicide; self-defence and provocation. This differential experience arises in
consequence of the law's construction of the partial defence of provocation, the
complete defence of self-defence and the rules governing evidence and
admissibility distinguishing fact from law. In this article, the boundaries set by
legal rules which distinguish law from fact, including rules of evidence,
especially as this distinction is affected by gender, will be examined. 1 It is
intended to consider the taken for granted and absolute distinction between
common sense and expert opinion, and to consider what kinds of behaviour
constitute provocative conduct, to consider how far this reflects all human or
primarily the male experience and to examine how far this becomes reconstituted
as the core of legal reasoning. It is proposed to consider how the experience of
women especially the reaction of battered women in self-defence, 2 provocation 3
and diminished responsibility 4 becomes constituted either as specialist
knowledge, and thereby bound by rules circumscribing the admissibility of
expert testimony to specific facts, or else is constituted as common sense
• Buckingham School of Law, the University of Buckingham.
1 J.M.Conley & W.M.O'Barr, Rules versus Relationships (The University of Chicago
Press, 1990); N.R.Cahn, "The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard
in Theory and in Practice" 77 Cornell L.Rev. 1398-1434 (1992).
2 Criminal Law Act 1967 s.3(I).
3 Homicide Act 1957 s.3.
4 Homicide Act 1957 s.2.
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knowledge and thereby excluding experts to speak to it. With the consequence
that where such facts are unknown to jurors, in the absence of an ascription of
mental illness, women's access to the legal defences is eroded. Some of these
considerations have been explored by inter alia O'Donovan, 5 Horder6 and
McColgan.7 This article extends this debate to include an assessment of recent
case law and case management in the light of Thornton (No.2), 8Morhall,9 Luc
Thiet Thuan v. R., 10 and Parkerll for those defending battered women who kill to
include consideration of the retrial of Sarah Thornton, 12 and the cases of
Sangha13 and Hobson. 14 The "rule" of Lord Goff in Luc holds that only those
characteristics relating to the gravity of the provocation are likely to be relevant
whilst characteristics relating to loss of self-control are not. Whilst a decision of
the Privy Council, in the light of the approach of the Court of Appeal in
Parker, 15 its authority is unresolved. This divide re-affirms the earlier reasoning
in Lesbinil6 which excluded bad-temperedness or pugnacity as a notional
characteristic under the limb of the objective test, precisely on the grounds that it
went to the defendant's loss of self-control, re-affirming the principles
enunciated in Welsh:
S K.O'Donovan, "Law's Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, The Battered Woman, and
Her Syndrome" (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 427-437.
6 J.Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, 1992).
7 A.McColgan, "In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill" (1993) 13 OJL.S. 508-529.
8 [1996] 2 All E.R. 1023 (C.A.).
9 [1995] 3 All E.R. 659.
10 [1996] 2 All E.R. 1033 (P.C.).
11 [1997] Crim.L.Rev.760.
12 Thornton Retrial, Oxford Crown Court, 13th.-24th.May, 1996. The author attended the
retrial and analysis is based on contemporaneous notes of the hearing.
13 [1997] 1 Cr.App.R.(S) 202.
14 [1997] Crim.L.Rev. 759; The Times 25th.May, 1997; The Independent 6th.June, 1997
(Transcript: Smith Bernal).
IS Supra. n.ll.
16 [1914] 3 K.B. 1116 (C.A.).
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"there must exist such an amount of provocation as would be
excited by the circumstances in the mind of the reasonable man, and
so as to lead the jury to ascribe the act to the influence of that
passion.,,1?
Recent efforts towards inclusion of battered woman syndrome as a notional
characteristic within a defence of provocation demonstrated in the cases of
Thornton (No.2) IH and Ahluwalia 19is now uncertain. How will courts interpret
Lue and will it make any difference? Whatever the "Goffian" schema, developed
in MorhaLPo and Luc, 21 which determines which characteristics are relevant and
which are not, for the battered woman, the violence and the threat of and
potential for violence, are realities enmeshed in her knowledge and perception
and determine her strategy for survival. In this case then, the "characteristic" is
not merely to be constructed as a lowered threshold of self-control induced in a
person following years of abuse, but instead is a "characteristic" of intimate
knowledge arising as a result of a habituated experience, grounded in
observation and prediction. The notional characteristic of battered woman
experience includes both these facets.
LEGAL RULES
(a)The dogma of a closed system: legal relevance and exclusion
The traditional approach to the metaphysics of law has regarded legal rules as
part of a closed autonomous system 22 where law's proper concern is with what is
determined by judges who declare law. The belief in the orthodoxy of an
unadulterated, entombed and sealed law, focusing "over deterministically" on
law as a discrete and isomorphic system with inherently neutral rules, is all
17 (1869) 11 Cox 336 at 338.
18 Supra.n.8.
19 [1992] 4 All E.R.889.
20 Supra.n.9.
21 Supra.n.lO.
22 Y.Kerruish, Jurisprudence as Ideology (Routledge, 1991) at 5; AHunt, "The Critique
of Law: What is 'Critical' about Critical Legal Theory?" in Critical Legal Studies, P.Fitzpatrick
& AHunt (eds.) (Basil Blackwell, 1987) at 10.
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pervasive. Law's rules, relevances, conventions and constructs, as if religious
hermeneutic dogma and omnipotent truth, are considered beyond question,
unassailable and definitive. Challenges to this hallowed orthodoxy have centred
on destabilising the credo that judges merely declare law and that legal
knowledge is given. 23"The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky."24 Such challenges have come from within and without.
"Those with a taste for fairy tales seem to have thought that in some
Aladdin's case there is hidden the Common Law in all its splendour
and that on ajudge's appointment there descends on him the
knowledge of magic words Open Sesame. Bad decisions are given
when the judge has muddled the password and the wrong door
opens. But we do not believe in fairy tales any more.,,25
The emergence of legal principles is considered the product of the wisdom of
judges, who divine law's "truth." Yet in truth judges are merely "reactive
agents" who accept or reject the proactive argument counsel put before them.26
Indeed, in recent trials of battered women who kill, it has been those challenges
to existing legal principles made by defence counsel which have set the
agenda(s) for the development of law in this area. In this sense, Lord Justice
Beldam, Lord Chief Justice Taylor, Lord Justice Hirst and Lord Steyn, whilst
ultimate arbiters of law's "truth," authenticate or invalidate the legal argument
on what traits can be considered as notional characteristics within the objective
test put before them by Lord Gifford Q.C. in Thornton, 27Geoffrey Robertson
Q.C. in Ahluwalia,28 Helen Grindrod Q.C. in Humphreys, 29and Michael
23 RCotterell, "Law's Community: Legal Theory and the Image of Legality" (1992) 19
Journal of Law and Society 405 at 414.
24 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen 244 U.S. 205 at 222 per Holmes J.(1917).
2S Lord Reid in S.Lee, Judging Judges (faber & faber, 1989) at 3.
26 P.Devlin, The Judge (O.V.P., 1979) at pp.12-13.
27 [1992] 1 All E.R. 306.
28 Supra.n.19.
29 [1995] 4 All E.R. 1008.
78
BATTERED WOMEN - IN FEAR OF Lue 'S SHADOW
Mansfield Q.C. in Thornton (No.2). 30Confirming that legal knowledge is
dependant upon challenges to law's ontology and the questions that are put to
law.3!Within this framework the "world known in common and taken for
granted" together with the framing of common sense and specialist knowledge,
and the way the problem is devised, are all questioned. 32Indeed, Mr.Justice
Holmes began this process of scrutiny from within:
"We are only at the beginning of a philosophical reaction, and of a
reconsideration of the worth of doctrines which for the most part
still are taken for granted without any deliberate, conscious, and
systematic questioning of their grounds.,,33
Heisenberg specifies this question thus:
"In so far as one can speak about scientific image of nature, one has
to treat it not so much as an image of nature but rather as the image
of our relationship with nature.,,34
The social theorist C.Wright Mills alluded to the essence of this reflexivity for
the understanding of knowledge:
"Between consciousness and existence stand meanings and designs
and communications which other men have passed on, first in
human itself and later by the management of symbols. Those
received and manipulated interpretations decisively influence such
consciousness as men have of their existence."35
30 Supra.n.8.
31 J.Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber (penguin, 1972).
32 C.Geertz, "Common Sense as a Cultural System" in Local Knowledge: Further Essays
in Interpretative Anthropology (Basic Books, New York, 1983); H.Garfinkel, Studies in
Ethnomethodology (penguin, 1967); A. Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World
(Heinemann Educational, 1972).
33 Mr.Justice Holmes, "The Path of the Law" (1897) X Harv.L.Rev. 457.
34 T.Shanin (ed.), The Rules of the Game (Tavistock, 1972).
35 CWright Mills, Power Politics and People (O.D.P., 1964) at 405.
79
DENNING LAW JOURNAL
These insights into the problem of reflexivity provide the basis for a critique of
legal rules and the provocation problem.
(b) Interpretative Reflexive Feminist Law.
One of the most pressing tasks for the feminist legal critique is an analysis of
legal rules and the implications of relevance, inclusions and exclusions for the
female subject. 36Such critique challenges the fallacy of law's gendered
neutrality37 and confronts the masculinism of the "definitions, assumptions and
ideals, and epistemological notions of a universal, objective rationality that
underlie our legal system," 38exposing both the silencing, contortion and
distortion of women's experience in law's constructs.39
Feminist legal criticism has demonstrated that law's universal objective
rationality, the basis oflegal doctrine, 40espoused in common law and precedent,
merely transforms male experience into an "objective" doctrine that passes for
the "normative"41 and as reflecting all human experience. 42One of the more
conspicuous ways this objective universal legality is constituted is within the
36 E.Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Beacon
Press, Boston, 1988); J.L.Orff, "Demanding Justice without Truth: The Difficulty of Postmodem
Feminist Legal Theory" (1995) 28 Loy.L.A.L.Rev.1197; S.williams, "Feminist Legal
Epistemology" (1993) 8 Berkeley Women's L.J 63.
37 S.L.R.Anleu, "Critiquing the Law: Themes andDilemmas inAnglo-American Feminist
Legal Theory" (1992) 19 Journal of Law and Society 423; N.R.Cahn, supra.n.l; R.Unikel,
"Reasonable Doubts: A critique of the reasonable women standard in American Jurisprudence"
(1992) 87 Nw. UL.Rev. 326.
38 L.Finley, "The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on
Feminism Unmodified" (1988) 82 Nw. UL.Rev. 352
39 E.M.Schneider, "Hearing Women not being heard: On Carol Gilligan's Getting
Civilised and the complexity of voice" (1994) 63 Fordham L.Rev.33 at 34; M.J.Mossman,
"Feminism and Legal Method: The difference it makes" (1986) 3 Australian Journal of Law and
Society 30.
40 V.Jackson, "Empiricism, Gender and legal pedagogy: An Experiment in a Federal
Court Service at Georgetown University Law Center" (1994) 83 Geo.L.J. 461 at 472.
41 J.E.Grbich, "The Body in Legal Theory" in M.A.Fineman & N.S.Thomadsen (eds.),
At the Boundaries of Law (Routledge, 1991) at 69.
42 D.Nicolson, "Truth, Reason and Justice: Epistemology and Politics in Evidence
Discourse" (1994) 57ML.R. 726 at 736.
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"reasonable man" construct, which occupies a centrifugal place in many
branches of law, of particular relevance to the objective test in provocation, 43and
of specific relevance to women's access to a defence of provocation. The
resonance of the standard universal subject permeates beyond the "reasonable
man" construct into rather more opaque expressions in the systemic ordering and
hierarchy of legal knowledge. The distinction forged between common sense
knowledge and expert opinion, the rules which circumscribe the entry or
exclusion of this knowledge and the judicial interpretation of these rules are
more invasive, determining what is deemed law or fact, what is material or
immaterial, thereby fixing the lens of legal cognition. As Lacey, Wells and
Meure recognise:
" ..rules of evidence and procedure, crucial to the practical impact of
criminal law, have been 'adjectival' and largely excluded from
studies of criminal law. These rules set out what mayor may not
count as evidence, whom it may be given by and about, what form
it may take, who may hear it, to what standard an issue must be
proved and by whom, when an issue may be withdrawn or
introduced."44
Common sense knowledge like the "reasonable man" standard is persuasively
passed off like a camera obscura as the "immediate deliverance of experience,
not deliberated reflections upon it." 45Consider the basis of the remarks of
Devlin, who writing of the common sense framework with reference to
corroboration in sexual cases asserted: "[i]t may not be long before the ordinary
juryman's and jurywoman's knowledge of sexual cases is sufficient to make a
warning unnecessary ..,,46By this he means that knowledge of women's
predilection to make allegations of a sexual nature will become part of everyday
common sense. What, however, is the nature of the knowledge to which he
43 M.Minow, "Feminist Reason: Getting it and Losing it" (1988) 38 Journal of Legal
Education 47; N.R.Cahn, supra.n.1.
44 Reconstructing Criminal Law (Weidenfeld, 1990) at 19-20; see also O'Donovan,
supra.n.S at 428.
4S c.Geertz, supra.n.32 at 75-77; R.H.Thompson, "Common Sense and Fact-Finding:
Cultural Reason in Judicial Decisions" (1995) XIX Legal Studies Forum 119 at 119.
46 Supra.n.26 at 195.
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refers? This, he explains when he writes:
"A type of case in which a warning is required is that in which a
charge of a sexual offence is made by a woman; these are
sometimes due to sexual neuroses which can produce phantasies in
which the woman half or even wholly believes.,,47
Here judicial subjectivism passes off and validates masculinist ideologies as
common sense and really "what everyone knows." This rule is now amended in
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 where:
"Any requirement whereby at a trial on indictment it is obligatory
for the court to give the jury a warning about convicting the accused
on the uncorroborated evidence of a person merely because that
person is (a) an alleged accomplice of the accused, or (b) where the
offence charged is a sexual offence, the person in respect of whom
it is alleged to have been committed, is hereby abrogated.'>48
OF LEGAL RELEVANCE-BATTERED WOMAN EXPERIENCE
In England and Wales battered women who kill their abusers have sought to
admit evidence of this abuse on two levels. First as evidence of diminished
responsibility, and secondly, as relevant at three junctures, to a defence of
provocation.
(aJ Battered Woman's Experience - "Expert" Knowledge.
The inclusion and admissibility of any knowledge, and its transfiguration into
legal knowledge depends upon one of the main organising schemes of value
reference in law - the distinction between fact and opinion. This distinction is
assumed and unquestioned:
"It is as if the idea of distinguishing between fact and opinion was
so overpowering in its logic that it simply fell from heaven into the
47 Ibid. at 189.
48 Section 32(1 )(b).
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vacant heads of the judiciary."49
In truth, knowledge about the fact and nature of repeat violence and its
"effects" on its recipients is neither common sense nor expert knowledge;
instead it inhabits a hiatus between the two. Where this experience is considered
relevant to state of mind- mens rea as in diminished responsibility, or relevant to
a heightened perception of danger as in self-defence, or as a notional
characteristic, introduction of this knowledge via the expert is admissible only if
the defendant is considered to be suffering from some form of mental illness.
This limitation on admissibility of mental state evidence drives the knowledge
about the battered woman's state of mind further into a therapeutic enclave,
allowing only women who are prepared to acquiesce to the label of "mental
illness," the opportunity to introduce such evidence. By contrast, the "male"
excuse for violence, articulated in a defence of provocation, is constituted as
common sense, avoiding the restriction placed on admissibility of mental illness
evidence, or from binding the defendant in the mental illness straight-jacket
necessary to a defence of diminished responsibility.
The leading case in interpreting the exclusionary rule, Turner, 50 established
that expert evidence is only admissible if it is "to furnish the court with scientific
information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a
judge or jury," 51 excluding psychiatric or psychological evidence where the
defendant is considered not to be suffering from a mental "illness." This rule has
limited expert evidence to a defence of diminished responsibility.
In Turner, Lord Justice Lawton, excluded evidence which might have
furthered the defence of provocation. The defence submission that "personality"
i. e. that the defendant had a deep emotional involvement with the victim, which
was likely to have caused an explosive rage after her confession to him that she
had associated with other men, should be considered as a notional characteristic,
was rejected by the court on the following grounds:
"We all know that both men and women who are deeply in love
can, and sometimes do, have outbursts of blind rage when
discovering unexpected wantonness on the part of their loved ones;
49 Carol A.G. Jones, Expert Witness: Science, Medicine and the Practice of Law
(Clarendon Press, 1994) at 6.
50 [1975] Q.B.834.
51 Ibid. at 841D.
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the wife taken in adultery is the classic example of the application
of the defence of 'provocation,' and when death or serious injury
results, profound grief usually follows. Jurors do not need
psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who are not suffering
from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains
of life."52 '
Concluding that "psychiatry has not yet become a satisfactory substitute for the
common sense of juries," 53Tapper notes "[t]he exclusion of opinion evidence on
the ultimate issue can easily become something of a fetish." 54When it comes to
the admissibility of expert evidence judges are diviners of law and fact,
managing, organising, transfiguring and translating social into legal reality. This
exclusionary rule has been applied inconsistently, 55condemning to a legal
vacuum, evidence which is neither common sense nor satisfies the test demanded
for admissibility of expert opinion. As Mackay and Colman accede 56judicial
attempts to divide mental abnormality into conditions that require elucidation
and those that do not has been unsatisfactory - "privileging certain types of
discourse. "57
The inconsistencies in the application of the Turner rule can be illustrated by
reference to confessional evidence where, the ad-hoc, case-by-case, nature of
judicial divining is at its most capricious. In Weightman 58the defence was not
permitted to call a psychiatrist who would have attested that the defendant "has
an abnormality of personality, which can best be described as a histrionic
personality disorder, characterised by emotional superficiality, impulsive
behaviour when under stress and an impaired capacity to develop and sustain
52 Ibid at 841 G,
53 Ibid at 843A
54 C.Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence (8th.ed"Butterworths, 1995) at 545,
55 R.D.Mackay & AM, Colman, "Excluding Expert Evidence: a tale of ordinary folk and
common experience" [1991] Crim.L.Rev. 800,
56 Ibid at 810,
57 C.Wells, "Battered Woman Syndrome and defences to homicide: where now?" (1994)
14Legal Studies 266 at 270.
58 (1991) 92 Cr.App.R. 291.
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deep or enduring relationships with other people" 59 in order to impugn the
reliability of her confession to the killing of her daughter of two years of age.
Indulging in hair-splitting discrimination, the defendant's abnormality of
personality was said not to be mental "illness." Lord Justice McCowan stated:
"At the end of the day however it is very much a question of the
facts in a particular case. It seems to us that the principle to be
learnt from the cases, notably the case of Turner, is that a
psychiatrist's evidence is inadmissible where its purpose is in effect
to tell a jury how a person who is not suffering from mental illness
is likely to react to the stresses and strains in life. The point taken
here is that the appellant has an abnormal personality, as was
conceded by Mr.Hunt for the prosecution at the trial. What does
that abnormal personality amount to however? It seems to us that it
is not something which is beyond the experience of normal non-
medical people. '>60
Although in the case of Ward, 61where the defence submitted evidence that she
was suffering from a "severe and deep rooted" 62personality disorder, it was held
on appeal that expert medical evidence of a psychiatrist or psychologist was
admissible at a criminal trial on the issue of whether what a defendant had said
in a confession or admission was reliable, even where the defendant was held not
to be suffering from mental illness, but suffering from a personality disorder
described as a mental disorder. This principle derives from Toohey v.
Metropolitan Police Commissioner 63- ''when a witness through physical (in
which I include mental) disease or abnormality is not capable of giving a true
reliable account to the jury, it must surely be allowable for medical science to
reveal this vital hidden fact to them.,,64
The court in Ward took the view that such evidence would have been
S9 Ibid at 293-294.
60 Ibid at 297.
61 [1993] 2 All E.R.577.
62 Ibid at 595g.
63 [1965] AC.595.
64 Ibid. per Lord Pearce at 608.
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admissible at the original trial had it been available, as it preceded Turner.
Although in Raghip, Silcott & Braithwaite, where Raghip had a low I.Q., the
court took the view that such evidence could be admitted. 65It would appear that
the courts have distinguished between those cases where medical evidence goes
to the issue of confessional evidence, and those cases where evidence of mental
illness goes to mens rea. Or is this decision merely left to judicial subjectivism,
where:
"the principle of relevance is portrayed as no more than a conduit
pipe for the application of whatever can be presented as reason, the
exclusion of facts which might challenge the politics contained in
.substantive law can be represented, not as a political decision, but
simply the neutral application of the principles of logic to the rules
of substantive law.'~6
In pleas of diminished responsibility and duress where women have attempted
to rely on battered woman experience to explain their state of mind, the
prosecution submit that battered women's evidence is not expert knowledge and
thereby ensure its exclusion. An example of such a strategy, although
unsuccessful, is found in Emery where the defendant was charged with
occasioning actual bodily harm on a young child and failure to protect her child
from her boyfriend's physical abuse. 67The defence was duress, and defending
counsel applied to call two experts, a psychologist and a psychiatrist. The
prosecution challenged the application submitting that the evidence to be
admitted was common sense and did not require expert opinion to speak to it.
Mr.Justice Astill, ruling the evidence admissible, said:
"There is potential expert evidence to the effect that if she is right,
her will could have been crushed. That would afford her a good
defence ..Therefore, without further explanation or understanding,
the jury's lack of understanding might lead to a guilty verdict,
whereas if they were to consider the expert evidence which seeks to
explain her conduct, they [might] find her not guilty. It follows
from that that in my judgment the effects of abuse of the scale and
6S The Times, 9th.December, 1991.
66 D.Nicolson, supra.n.42.
67 (1993) 14 Cr.App.R.(S) 394.
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persistence she describes might well not be within the capacity of a
jury to understand unassisted by expert evidence.,,68
Mr.Justice Astill modified the Turner rule in respect of mens rea for duress to
allow for admission of expert opinion in accordance with only one of the two
criteria: that the knowledge to be admitted was "evidence which was complex
and not known by the public at large" - thereby circumventing the second
tortuous question of whether the mental abnormality of the defendant was one of
mental "illness" or not. This modification is critical to the future inclusion of
battered woman evidence in cases where that evidence may be said not to
constitute a mental illness but a personality disorder.
(b) Battered Woman Experience and provocation.
Where the defence is one of provocation, battered woman experience has been
relevant in three ways.
(i) Cumulative Provocation
First, battered woman experience is relevant to an understanding of the nature
and history of the abuse, whereby the abused woman's common experience that
domestic violence is not episodic, but repeated, persistent and escalating, are
facts which have been admitted as legally relevant to the background
circumstances as part of cumulative provocation. 69Such facts have been
admitted as common sense and their admission sanctioned as relevant by the
Court of Appeal in Thornton (No.2), 70 reversing Mr.Justice Devlin's classic
direction in Duffy that "[s]evere nervous exasperation or a long course of
conduct causing suffering and anxiety are not by themselves sufficient to
constitute provocation in law," 71 resolving inconsistency where in Fantle, 72 the
whole history was deemed relevant, whilst in Brown, 73 the history was restricted
to the morning of the killing. Lord Taylor asserted:
68 Ibid. at 397.
69 M.Wasik, "Cumulative Provocation and Domestic Killing" [1982] Crim.L.Rev. 29.
70 Supra.n.8.
71 [1949] 1 AllE.R. 932.
n [1959] Crim.L.Rev. 585.
73 [1972] 2 All E.R. 1328.
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"The severity of such a syndrome and the extent to which it may
have affected a particular defendant will no doubt vary and it is for
the jury to consider ...it may form an important background to
whatever triggered the actus reus. A jury may more readily find
there was a sudden loss of control triggered by even a minor
incident, if the defendant has endured abuse over a period, on the
'last straw' basis."74
Lord Goff in Lue also reaffirms the relevance of cumulative provocation:
"Their Lordships wish to add, as a footnote, that it may be open to a
defendant to establish provocation in circumstances in which the act
of the deceased, though relatively unprovocative if taken in
isolation, was the last of a series of acts which finally provoked the
loss of self-control by the defendant and so precipitated his extreme
reaction which led to the death of the deceased ...Whether such a
principle could successfully be invoked in cases such as, for
example, the 'battered wife syndrome' is a matter upon which their
Lordships can in the present case express no opinion, having heard
no argument upon it, but must await a case in which the point arises
for decision."75
(ii) Perception and heightened awareness.
Secondly, on the question of the "effect" of violence on the abused woman
there are two aspects to consider. The first aspect concerns the "effect" of repeat
violence on the abused woman's heightened perception and specialist knowledge
of the abuser's behaviour, which in tum shapes the abused woman's vigilance
and strategy for survival. The effect of repeat violence on perception and
anticipation of further violence is relevant to a defence of self-defence and
provocation and to the "reasonableness" of the abused woman's response. Yet,
efforts to assimilate the "effect" of the abuser's violence on the battered
woman's "knowledge" of his behaviour and "perception" of likely harm or
death, to thereby inform legal argument that self-defence is "reasonable in the
74 See also supra. n.8 at l030c.
75 Supra.n.1O at l047a-c.
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circumstances"76 have been, thus far, unsuccessful. 77This is because the meaning
of what is "reasonable" accords with, and is bound by, masculine experience and
conventions. Hence there is the expectation of retreat, the use of proportionate
force and a temporal proximity between the threat and use of violence, if self-
defence is to succeed. The battered woman's belief that she is in immediate
danger, her perception of the temporal proximity of violence in the absence of
"immediate" violence has been excluded as not "reasonable."
The meaning of imminent and immediate has been expanded to allow for
accommodation of the battered woman's response as a prolonged and chronic
rather than acute provocation. There has been an expansion of the understanding
oftemporal proximity time lapse from Mancini, 78whereupon the requirement
was immediate to the morning of the killing, approved by the judge in Brown79
although unacceptable to the jury. Where trial judges have applied a more
narrow approach the Court of Appeal is reticent to controvert although in many
instances it is trial judges who have adopted a broader approach. The adherence
to the Du.ffy80 formulation is undeniably curious given the wider formulation of
"loss of self-control" facilitated in the Homicide Act 1957, 81 and the common
law, pre-Duffy, which was less concerned with "suddenness" and more
concerned with whether the killing was motivated by revenge. 82 Lord Chief
Justice Taylor, in Ahluwalia explains that, whilst a delayed reaction would not
necessarily defeat a defence of provocation "..the longer the delay and the
stronger the evidence of deliberation on the part of the defendant, the more likely
76 Criminal Law Act 1967 s.3(1) - "A person may use such force as is reasonable in the
circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of
offenders or suspected offenders, or of persons unlawfully at large."
77 SeeRossiter (1992) 95 Cr.App.R. 326; Gardiner TheIndependent 3Oth.October, 1992;
Oatridge (1991) 94 Cr.App.R. 367; Line The Daily Telegraph 4th.February, 1992; Hobson
supra.n.14.
78 Mancini v. D.P.P. [1942] A.C. 1.
79 Supra.n.73 at 1333.
80 Supra.n.71.
81 Section 3.
82 (1833) 6 C. & P. 157.
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it will be that the prosecution will negative provocation." 83In Ahluwalia, 84it is
clear that a new meaning is attached to the phrase "sudden and temporary"
switching the focus away from the earlier decided meaning of the proximity in
time between the last act of provocation and the retaliation as articulated in
Mancini,8s to embrace a meaning of "sudden" which instead enlarges on the
nature and character of the reaction, which incidentally is more consonant with
the literal meaning of the word "sudden." Indeed Smith and Hogan write:
"It seems that the words 'sudden and temporary,' imply only that
the act must not be pre-meditated. It is the loss of control which
must be 'sudden,' which does not mean 'immediate' ,,86
Whilst this development is novel for the Court of Appeal, trial judges, whose
reasoning is less conspicuous, have often retreated from the Duffy formulation
placing a greater emphasis on the quality and nature of the response.87
Furthermore, there have been limitations placed on the nature of the reaction
which has relied on a physical manifestation of anger, rage and passion,88
whereas it is a state of despair, anxiety and trauma which more correctly
characterises the abused woman's experience of loss of self-control.
(iii) A vexed question - battered women's experience as a notional characteristic.
The third juncture at which battered women's experience is of relevance
concerns the "effect" repetitive violence, including living in continuous fear of
further violence, has on mental well-being focussing on anxiety, depression and
post traumatic stress and the possible effect on mens rea. It is here that the
experience of the battered woman mayor may not result in "battered woman
syndrome." This appreciation of the effect of violence and fear of violence on
83 Supra.n.19 at 896d.
84 Supra.n.19.
8S Supra.n.78 at 9.
86 J.C.Smith & B.Hogan, Smith and Hogan on Criminal Law: Cases and Materials
(6th.ed., Butterworths, 1996) at 365.
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mental and physical state has followed on psychological advances identifying
and defining a specific condition of "battered woman's syndrome" experienced
by victims of repeat abuse. It is with respect to the mental and physical health of
abused women that attention has focused both in the clinical and legal setting. In
the clinical setting the concern has been to treat the fear, anxiety and trauma of
the battered woman, whilst within the legal setting the concern has been to
determine whether the battered woman has a lowered threshold of self-control,
and if so, whether this should be considered relevant to mens rea. Within the
clinical arena there is no universal agreement on the nature of the condition,
although since 1994 it has been recognised as a mental illness within the British
classification of mental diseases. 89 Nevertheless, without a more certain
symptomatology, diagnosis and prognosis, women's experiences of the effects of
battering, encounter difficulties in being used to assess responsibility (mens rea).
At the same time, attempts to formulate the "condition" in scientific terms have
severely limited its use and accessibility to only those women who display the
required symptomatology. Walker, from whose work understanding of the
condition originally derives, describes helplessness, fear, trauma and
entrapment. 90 Criticised by feminist psychologists, and controverted by
prosecutors, the "syndrome", so-called, it is argued wrongly connotes a mens rea
which goes towards explaining why women who are battered cannot leave
violent men, rather than explaining the necessity of the last act in their efforts at
survival.
Evidence of battered woman syndrome has constituted a notional characteristic
of the objective test in provocation, if it is of the necessary degree of
permanence.91 Lord Chief Justice Taylor explains:
" ..depending on the medical evidence, the syndrome may have
affected the defendant's personality so as to constitute a significant
characteristic ..."92
89 See supra.n.14.
90 L.Walker, Terrifying Love: When the Battered Woman Kills (Harper and Row, New
York, 1989).
91 Supra.n.19 at 898a.
92 Supra.n.8 at 1030d.
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Lord Chief Justice Taylor in Ahluwalia, 93in responding to Geoffrey Robertson's
ground of appeal, that the defendant was suffering from battered woman
syndrome, such that it had "become a characteristic within the meaning of Lord
Diplock's formulation," 94intimated that if battered woman syndrome evidence
had been admitted at the original trial, or indeed evidence of any other specific
condition, which could amount to a characteristic, "different considerations may
have applied,"95 and thus defacto authenticated the battered woman "syndrome"
as a notional characteristic. The idea of a notional characteristic embracing
mental state/personality was further developed by Lord Chief Justice Taylor in
Dryden,96 where he concluded that "the obsessiveness on the part of the
appellant and his eccentric character" 97was a characteristic. Lord Justice Hirst
adopted a similar approach in Humphreys, 98and declared a personality with
"immature and explosive and attention seeking traits," 9geventhough these traits
did not form part of the gravity of the provocation expressly, consistent with the
"reasonable man" standard. He added:
"[T]he jury would, as ever, use their collective common sense to
determine whether the provocation was sufficient to make a person
of reasonable self-control in the totality of the circumstances
(including personal characteristics) act as the defendant did."
Neither Lord Chief Justice Taylor nor Lord Justice Hirst differentiated between
characteristics which formed part of a personality which was predisposed to loss
of self-control and characteristics which were manifest features of the individual
and specifically referred to by the provocation. The judge must give directions to
the jury on both objective and subjective tests indicating what evidence
including relevant characteristics might be capable of amounting to provocation
93 Supra.n.19 at 898e.
94 Ibid at 897d.
9S Ibid at 898f.
96 (1995] 4 All E.R. 987.
97 Ibid at 998d.
98 Supra.n.29.
99 Ibid at 1012d.
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(per Lord Goff in Morhall). 100 Lord Justice Stuart-Smith in Stewart, stated:
"In our judgment, where the judge must, as a matter of law, leave
the issue of provocation to the jury, he should indicate to them,
unless it is obvious, what evidence might support the conclusion
that the appellant lost his self-control."lOl
This suggests that judges must consider, where relevant, instructing the jury to
consider battered woman syndrome as a notional characteristic, as well as
indicating to them evidence pointing to loss of self-control, thereby divining
further what is and what is not relevant.
There has been some guidance on the battered woman syndrome as a notional
characteristic. Lord Chief Justice Taylor, in placing limits on the expansion of a
mental state as a notional characteristic in Dryden, asserted:
"In our opinion it is not enough to constitute a characteristic that the
offender should merely in some general way be mentally deficient
or weak minded."102
However it seems clear that battered woman syndrome cannot be classified as
a mental deficiency or weak mindedness. Following the judgment of the Privy
Council in Lue Thiet Thuan v. R., 103the untested status of battered woman
syndrome evidence as a notional characteristic is thrown further into question.
Here, the defendant appealed against a conviction for the murder of his former
girlfriend, who had sustained multiple stab wounds consistent with defensive
wounds, on the ground that the trial judge had wrongly rejected the defence
submission that evidence of a medical condition - a form of "organic brain
dysfunction" that left him with a difficulty in controlling an impulse - as relevant
to provocation. Lord Goff delivering the majority judgment of the Board (Lord
Steyn dissenting) rejecting this ground of appeal, declared the recent expansion
100 Supra.n.9 at 668.
101 [1995] 4 All E.R. 999 at 1007a.




of the notional characteristic principle in Ahluwalia, 104HumphreyslO5 and
DrydenlO6 and by extension, Thornton (No.2), 107to be wrong:
"But it is an entirely different question whether the mental infirmity
of the defendant which impairs his power of self-control should be
taken into account; and indeed it is difficult to see how it can be
consistent with a person having the power of self-control of an
ordinary person."108
Lord Goff following his earlier reasoning inMorhall, 109was critical of those
who had followed McGregor, 110and those who, in recent cases such as
Newell,"1 had taken the view that the characteristic might be a more transitory
phenomenon. InMorhall he asserted:
"At all events it follows that, in a case such as the present, a
distinction may have to be drawn between two different situations.
The first occurs where the defendant is taunted with his addiction
(for example, that he is an alcoholic, or a drug addict, or a glue
sniffer), or even with having been intoxicated (from any cause) on
some previous occasion. In such a case, however discreditable such
a condition may be, it may where relevant be taken into account as
going to the gravity of the provocation. The second is the simple
fact of the defendant being intoxicated - being drunk, or high with
drugs or glue - at the relevant time, which may not be so taken into





108 Supra.n.1O at 1041b.
109 Supra.n.9 at 659 & 667e-f.
110 [1962] N.Z.L.R.l 069.
111 (1980) 71 Cr.App.R.331.
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is excluded as a matter of policy." 112
He argued that the meaning of English statute could not be derived from
McGregor 113 and, secondly, that the New Zealand case law in McCarthy 114 had
trenchantly critiqued and disapproved of the earlier approach taken in McGregor
upon which the cases of Taaka, 115 and Leilua116 had relied. Lord Goff argued that
this reasoning had resulted in an "unhappy influence" 117 on the development of
English case law, in the cases of Ahluwalia, 118 Dryden 119 and Humphreys 120
especially. Indeed as Lord Chief Justice Taylor asserts in Dryden 121_ "[w]hat
characteristics are appropriate for the jury to consider has been a vexed question
since Camplin." In Luc, 122 Lord Goff returned to his reasoning inMorhall, 123
where he had distinguished between those cases where loss of self-control is the
result of provocation which is directed at the characteristic and where loss of
self-control is not specifically the result of provocation being directed at that
characteristic, relying on the earlier argument of Ashworth, who asserted:
"The proper distinction ..is that individual peculiarities which bear
on the gravity of the provocation should be taken into account,
whereas individual peculiarities bearing on the accused's level of
112 Supra.n.9 at 667e-f.
113 Supra.n.IIO.
114 [1992] 2 N.z.L.R. 550.
lIS [1982] I N.Z.L.R. 198.
116 [1986] N.Z.Recent Law 118.




121 Supra.n.94 at 997a.





His consideration of Ashworth goes considerably beyond the now permitted
reference to parliamentary debates in pursuit of the interpretation of statute (ej
Pepper v. Hart 125)maligned earlier in Davis v. Johnson. 126
Lord Goff asserted that it would very rarely be necessary to explain this
distinction to the jury presumably because they would understand it. 127It is
suggested that this fails to consider the following point. Whilst an example of
where the notional characteristic was affected by the gravity of the provocation
would be provided where, for example, a man with an exceptionally large nose is
taunted about it, and an example of the notional characteristic provided by the
loss of self-control would be provided by a man claiming provocation because of
over-sensitivity, or an inability to control a temper, it is rarely ever the case that
this distinction presents itself so clearly distinguished and caricatured.
Indeed on this point Lord Steyn in Lue 128found that there was no such
spurious and artificial and restrictive rule which excluded from consideration
characteristics which went to loss of self-control - "[i]n my view a jury would be
rather puzzled by such artificially compartrnentalised direction."129
The accommodation of notional characteristics of the accused has softened the
objective test in order to allow for consideration of the impact of provocation on
one especially predisposed to a specific provocation. Case law indicates that
whilst an excitable personality or quick temper cannot rely on provocation, 130 it
would be difficult to see how a battered woman who was being abused could not
rely on this feature as a notional characteristic since the provocation if not
expressly, then impliedly, goes to the characteristic. The battered woman is
targeted repeatedly by her abuser precisely because she is a battered woman. It is
argued here that the battered woman characteristic also goes to the loss of self-
124 A.Ashworth, "The Doctrine of Provocation" [1976] CL.J 292 at 299.
125 [1993] 1 All E.R. 42 (H.L.).
126 [1979] A.c. 264.
127 Supra. n.1 O.
128 Ibid at l048g.
129 Ibid at l049g.
130 Supra.n.16.
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control, since the fact of being repeatedly battered alters and effects her
perception of her abuser and her response to what the non-battered woman may
only consider slight provocation. Simply the battered woman knows of what the
abuser is capable!
It seems that Lord Goff's reasoning and close inspection derives from a
repugnance with the alternative outcome in Lue, 131if the notional characteristics
were to be accommodated. Indeed Lord Chief Justice Taylor had earlier in
Morhall,132 resisted Lord Goff s reasoning on similar grounds of repugnance:
" ..logic would demand similar indulgence towards an alcoholic, or a
defendant who had illegally abused heroin, cocaine, or crack to the
point of addiction. Similarly, a paedophile, upbraided for molesting
children, would be entitled to have his character weighed in his
favour on the issue of provocation"133
Lord Steyn argued that the purpose of the courts is to work out "sensible and just
solutions," 134arguing for the relevance of personality disorder affecting self-
control on the basis that:
"The view of the law contended for by the prosecution will
inevitably lead to injustice. It will result in convictions of murder
and mandatory life sentences in cases where that is wholly
inappropriate. In my view our law does not compel such crude and
unfair results.,,135
He concluded that the decisions in Ahluwalia and Dryden are the expressions of
the dictates of justice over the prompting of legal logic. 136"In the meantime
nobody should underestimate the capacity of our law to move forward where
\31 Supra.n.IO.
132 Supra.n.9.
133 Ibid. at 663b.
134 Supra.n.lO at I05Ia.
135 Ibid. at I049g.
136 Ibid. at 1055d - n.b.Lord Steyn supported Lord Goff's opinion in Morhall.
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necessary, putting an end to demonstrable unfairness exposed by experience,"13?
- an allegiant to the way opened and the path shown by Lord Chief Justice
Taylor, a dynamic and creative law-maker and man of justice.
WALKING IN THE SHADOW OF LUC
The authority of the Privy Council in Luc of course is not absolute, although
Smith and Hogan argue:
"Decisions of the Privy Council are not binding on English courts;
but when the Board consists of five Lords of Appeal and may be
thought to represent the opinion of the House of Lords, it can hardly
be ignored,,138
In any event, whatever the status of Luc, the reasoning replicates that hitherto
developed by the House of Lords in Morhall, whilst the Court of Appeal in
Parker139 has refused to follow Luc, although the grounds for dissension,
whether in whole, or in part, were not explicated. Justice for battered women
who kill, continues to be cloaked in the shadow of Luc and Morhall. Recent case
management in cases involving battered women who kill, post-Luc, reflects a
predilection towards a defence of diminished responsibility in order to avoid
inviting the prosecution challenges that would inevitably flow from the .
reasoning in Luc, as the following cases strongly suggest.
(a) The Thornton Retrial - diminished responsibility and provocation.
The retrial of Sarah Thornton at Oxford Crown Court on 13th. May, 1996 was
expected to rely on fresh evidence relating to battered woman syndrome. Such
evidence was not to play any part, whether as an element of psychiatric evidence
and therefore expert opinion under the limb of the defence of diminished
responsibility, or as a characteristic of the "reasonable man" under the limb of
the objective test of provocation. Pleading diminished responsibility and
provocation together, the boundaries of reasonableness and unreasonableness,
137 Ibid at I055g.
138 Supra.n.85 at 432.
139 Supra. n. 11.
98
BATTERED WOMEN - IN FEAR OF Lue 'S SHADOW
common sense knowledge and expert opinion were deliberately blurred. So too
was the burden of proof - on the defence to prove diminished responsibility on
the balance of probabilities, and in provocation on the prosecution to prove
beyond all reasonable doubt that the case was not one of provocation. It was
perhaps an understandable strategy, since at the pre-trial conference preceding
the original trial, that lack of intent - involuntary manslaughter - unlawful and
dangerous act- provocation - diminished responsibility - were all canvassed.140
At that first trial, Thornton pleaded diminished responsibility, the jury
considered the medical evidence insufficient, or not such as to impair
substantially her responsibility. Counsel did not rely on provocation, although it
was a defence put to the jury by the judge and similarly rejected by them. An
appeal was won on the ground that battered woman syndrome had not been
properly considered by the judge as a notional characteristic of the accused. On
retrial, the mainstay of the defence argument was evidence of cumulative
provocation - that of a chronic alcoholic husband who was on occasion violent -
on a person suffering from an abnormality of mind. This in tum was considered
for its impact on an "alcoholic's wife," which it was submitted constituted a
notional characteristic. Dr.Glatt, in written evidence, delineated the
characteristics of an alcoholic's wife:
"gradually worn out by emotional strain and stress, living on the
edge of a volcano - such a wife might frequently lose her self-
control which might snap suddenly when something for her may
become the last straw any reasonable wife would be affected."141
Defence counsel, Michael Mansfield Q.c., presented the
culmination of this as - "[i]t's the snap, it's a bridge too far, a straw
too much.,,142The defendant's evidence to establish diminished
responsibility was evidence of an histrionic disorder, including
attempts at suicide, being found walking naked by police in
Withington, Manchester, clutching a teddy-bear, the latter incident
resulting in admission to hospital under the Mental Health Act
1983. Thornton, it was said, satisfied the criteria of someone
suffering from post traumatic stress disorder. It was unclear
whether this post traumatic stress disorder was to form a part of the





diminished responsibility, and thereby requiring experts to speak to
it, or a notional characteristic and part of a defence of provocation,
and thereby common sense knowledge following the Turner rule.
Summing-up Michael Mansfield said:
"You have a sense of the pressures - a pressure cooker .. we have a
complicated situation - living with an alcoholic and having a
disordered personality.,,143
In redirecting the jury on provocation, Mr.Justice Scott Baker said:
"~ovocation is a single act or a series of acts done or words said or
a combination of both which causes in the defendant a sudden and
temporary loss of self-control which would cause a reasonable
person to lose self-control and behave as the defendant did.
Provocation may have been such that it caused a temporary loss of
self-control and at that time not being master of his mind. It is not
enough to be made angry or smouldering resentment or revenge."
Elaborating further on what factors might constitute characteristics, he asked the
jury to consider whether she was -
"unable to control herself ...unable to stop .. whatever provoked the
defendant to lose her self-control must have made an ordinary
reasonable and sober woman in the same position as the defendant
react as the defendant did affecting the gravity to her.. an ordinary
reasonable person with such characteristics. The characteristics you
may consider are the defendant's personality disorder and the
background of living with Malcolm Thornton, an alcoholic, and the
domestic circumstances between them, that is whatever she had to
put up with before .. you are entitled to look at previous conduct -
that the deceased was an alcoholic."144
Psychiatric evidence submitted on behalf of the prosecution sought to demolish
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out that she did not fit the stereotype:
"She appears resourceful and determined rather than in deep
despair. There is no evidence that she has lost self-respect or esteem
or given up in despair. It is not a picture of a person who is
seriously anxious, depressed, nor self-loathing."
It is particularly this limitation which has so often been fatal to adducing battered
woman syndrome as a defence. Two psychiatrists for the defence gave evidence
that she suffered from a mental disorder which they considered "equivalent" to
battered woman syndrome. Acquitting her of murder and convicting her of
manslaughter, Mr.Justice Scott Baker sentenced Thornton to a term of five
years' imprisonment, which she had already served, on the basis, not of
provocation, but of diminished responsibility! 145
The inability of many battered women to fit the passive victim stereotype of
the syndrome has constituted a key obstacle to its admissibility in the U.S.(see
United States v. Wilson 146& United States v. Whitetail 147) as well as in England
and Wales as the Thornton cases suggest. There has been, however, some limited
expansion of the characteristics of the syndrome to allow for the admissibility of
battered woman syndrome in cases where women are resourceful and not passive
- see for example Bennett (No.2). 148 There are further objections to the admission
of battered woman syndrome under a diminished responsibility defence where
the syndrome creates a "pathological cul-de-sac" for women, 149 shifting the
vortex away from the reasonableness of the defendant's action onto the
unreasonableness and abnormality of her state of mind. The decision in the
Thornton retrial, not to rely on battered woman syndrome is indicative of the
defence's anticipation of the pitfalls of fitting the syndrome typology in its
entirety to the defendant, together with the difficulties in arguing battered
woman syndrome as a notional characteristic under provocation.
145 S.S.M.Edwards & CWalsh, "The Justice of Retrial" (1996) 146 NL.J 857.
1462nd.February, 1993 Lexis Transcript No.4584.
147956 F.2d.857 (1992).
148O.J.No.892 cited in E.Sheehy, "Battered Woman Syndrome: Developments in
Canadian Law After R.v. Lavallee" in Women, Male Violence and the Law edited by J.Stubbs,
The Institute of Criminology Monograph Series No.6, Sydney, Australia.
149H.Kennedy, Eve Was Framed (Chatto and Windus, 1992) at 94.
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(b) Sangha - More abuse but more diminished responsibility.
Again the shadow of Luc casts its silhouette on trial management in the case of
SanghalSO where a provocation defence might well have been the strategy pre-
LUG. In Sangha a battered wife killed an abusive and adulterous husband, and
also tried to kill herself. Her defence was one of diminished responsibility. The
facts suggest clearly that a defence of provocation would have been available
and certainly preferable, given that the battered woman defendant does not see
herself as mentally ill, but sees her actions as reasonable. However, given the
debate which has bifurcated the evolution of the notional characteristic into those
characteristics which go to the gravity of the provocation and those which go to
the loss of self-control, only the former being legitimate, undeniably the safer
strategy is a defence of diminished responsibility.
"Mr.Singh has described the catalogue of mental and physical
cruelty and abuse to which the appellant was exposed by her
husband over a period of more than 20 years of marriage. It is
summarised as having included regular violence between 1975 and
1990. Incidents involved her being punched, kicked, almost
strangled, struck with a walking stick and with a pan, beaten whilst
she was pregnant and beaten in front of her parents. It is said that
her husband showed her no love, care or affection but, on the
contrary, was liable to force physical sex upon her without her
consent. He would sulk and refuse to speak to her for periods of
days or even weeks. He took from her all that she earned and used
her wages for his own purposes or, on occasion, to send to his own
family abroad. He made degrading comments of a sexual nature to
the appellant and even to her sister. He drank regularly to excess,
either in the house or by staying out late for the purpose. He would
mock her religious beliefs: An example of that was intentionally
using her pans to cook meat despite the fact that for religious
reasons she is herself a vegetarian. He showed (and this is
important) violence to his children from time to time. In October,
1990 he beat two of his three daughters over the head with a hockey
stick, as a result of which they were bruised, and the consequence
of that ultimately was that all three daughters, to the great distress
of the appellant, were taken into,care; For that offence the husband
was convicted of assault occasioning actual. bodily hann. Although
ISO Supra.n.13.
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physical violence to the appellant evidently ceased after 1990, it
continued in relation to the children. On one occasion the thrashing
of one of the sons left him black and blue, and on another occasion
drew blood. We have already described the extent of the work that
both at home and in the course of her employment was carried out
by the appellant. It is said on her behalf that the cumulative effect
on her was very damaging. She coped for long periods but would
from time to time become distraught and depressed. That resulted in
five separate occasions over the years on which she attempted to
take her own life. They showed a desperate and depressed woman
who, as it is said on her behalf, could see no way out of her
plight. "151
The defence strategy might well have been that of provocation although in the
light of Morhall/Luc the outcome of a provocation defence was less predictable
than that of a defence of diminished responsibility.
(c) Hobson - U-turns - battered woman experience as diminished responsibility.
Luc similarly cast a shadow in the appeal of Kathleen Hobson against her
murder conviction on 19th.October, 1992 at Liverpool Crown Court. 152 Hobson
stabbed and killed her abusive and alcoholic partner. Her defence of self-defence
failed. There had been a history of violence. At the first trial, no evidence of
battered woman syndrome had been admitted. The grounds for appeal were tllat
at the time she was suffering from battered woman syndrome and would have
therefore pleaded diminished responsibility. Helena Kennedy Q.c., counsel for
Hobson, did not argue on appeal, (as well might have been the case before Lue)
that a defence of provocation had not been adequately put by the judge as an
alternative to self-defence, or that battered woman syndrome was relevant to a
defence of provocation. The facts clearly indicated a history of violence and
evidence of cumulative provocation. The appellant had endured considerable
violence at the hands of the deceased over some 18 months prior to the offence,
she had called the police on some 30 previous occasions, making formal
complaints on four oc:casions. The evidence of two psychiatrists, Dr.Mezey and
Dr.Ghosh, was that Hobson was suffering at the time from battered woman






"It was not until 1994 that Battered Womens' Syndrome was
included in the standard British classification of mental diseases,
although, prior to that date, it had been included in the American
classification. In consequence, at the time of the appellant's trial in
1992 it would not have been a condition which would have been
readily considered by practising British psychiatrists, save the
relatively small number who had a particular experience and
expertise in relation to that condition. Battered Womens' Syndrome
is a variant of post-traumatic stress disorder."
It was also added - "that that condition, if it existed at the relevant time, was
material to the defendant's characteristics when they fell to be considered in
relation to the defence of provocation under s.3 of the Act." Me.Riordon Q.C.,
for the prosecution, whilst accepting the existence of battered woman syndrome
and its relevance to diminished responsibility, argued that the symptoms she had
were not of a degree which would give rise to an abnormality of mind, such as to
sustain a defence of diminished responsibility. A retrial was ordered.
A LEGAL PROSTHETIC?
Whichever way the experience of battered women is legally reconstituted in
the future - either as a notional characteristic or as an abnormal mental state - it
remains a precarious appendix to a systemic masculinist law. How can the
feminist challenge to law advance when the systemic organisation of law's fabric
remains masculinist? In the United States there have been some successes in
challenging law's frame of reference. The "Wanrow jury instruction" 153 is a
product of a recognition that the standard universal subject speaks exclusively of
men. The court in granting Wanrow a retrial held that the defendant's actions are
to be judged against her own subjective impressions and not those which a
detached jury might determine to be objectively reasonable. 154 Other attempts to
address the genderism of legal rules on the basis that a rule in respect of modus
operandi may not be applicable to women, is provided in Easterling v. State,
where the defendant was grabbed by the hair, beaten and choked by the
153 559 P.2d.548 (1977).
154 Ibid. at 558.
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deceased. 155 She then stabbed him. The court, on appeal, recognised that
particular physical attributes of a defendant might justify her use of a dangerous
weapon to repel an unarmed attacker. In Ellison v. Brady, a nominally feminist
"reasonable woman" standard was adopted for sexual harassment in the
workplace. 156 In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia two female police officers who
were subjected to derogatory name calling and pornography at work, had their
complaint assessed in accordance with a "reasonable woman" standard, a work
environment hostile and offensive to women of reasonable sensitiveness.157
However, merely adding women to law 158 to accommodate battered women's
experience has been widely argued to be incapable of resolving the problem.159
Women's experiences are either excluded or, if included, are hardly
recognisable, reconstituted and transfigured by law, these experiences must fit
within pre-existing frameworks, rules and conventions. This means that the
woman in fear of her life who acts in self-defence surviving in the shadow of
Lue must plead diminished responsibility however mismatched. Thus the lack of
synchronicity between women's experiences and the way in which law includes
and thereby misframes them continues. It is not possible to skin the law of its
masculinism, nor is it enough to engage in grafting women on through some
politically cosmetic prosthesis solution, the morphology and ontology of law
must continue to be confronted immediately and the artificiality of rules and
relevances such as the "rule" in Lue resisted.
ISS 267 P.2d 185 (1954).
156924 F.2d 872 (9th.Cir., 1991) at 878.
157895 F.2d.1469 at 1480 & 1481 (1990).
158 C.Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge, 1989) at 66.
159 Supra.n.57 at 275.
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